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 Honeypots systems are an important piece of the network security 
infrastructure and can be deployed to accomplish different purposes such as: 
network sensing, capturing and learning about 0-day exploits, capturing and 
analyzing of black hat techniques, deterring black hats and data gathering for 
doing statistical analysis over the Internet traffic, among others. 
Nevertheless, all honeypots need to look like real systems, due to if a 
honeypot is unmasked, it loses its value. This paper presents a new procedure 
to detect low interaction honeypots, through HTTP request, regardless 
honeypot architecture. It is important to mention that Low Interaction 
Honeypots network services need to be improved in order to get trustworthy 
information. Otherwise, it should consider data obtained by low interaction 
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Nowadays, honeypots systems are important components in the organization’s whole security 
infrastructure. They can be used to help sense and mitigate security events. 
In [1], the author gives the de facto definition: 'A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies 
on being probed, attacked and compromised'. However, if a honeypot is detected, it loses all its value. In 
other words, if honeypots were susceptible to be detected, the Black hat Community could post a list of 
known honeypots systems letting others black hats avoid those systems and focus on real systems. 
Honeypot systems are used to research over malware propagation and new intrusion techniques used 
by black hats. They can give the possibility to detect and analyze 0-day exploits or to obtain information 
related to malware such as: propagation methods or even their source code. Moreover, a honeypot could act 
like an alarm system because any received connection, from a host inside organizational network, is an 
unequivocal indication that information security mechanisms have been evaded or there is an insider attacker. 
This information could be used to design contention methods against malware, to improve network security 
mechanism, to define new security policies or change some of them. Additionally to that, the managers could 
take better IT decisions to search about security infrastructure or to deploy new IT services for clients and 
partners of each organization. However, it is an important task to keep honeypot systems unidentified in 
order to collect information from the network and reach its goals. 
Nowadays, honeypot's remote detection is not an easy task because the detection of uncommon 
environments depends on the black hat’s skills. In example, detecting a decrease in the speed of the returning 
packets over the network, a limited amount of commands in the service or the operating system, limited 
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amount of libraries and restricted access to memory or file system areas. Doing this detection implies the 
interaction between the black hat and honeypot system for a while. 
Honeypot systems are able to efficiently emulate a TCP/IP stack and they also can simulate being 
another Operating System over the network. Besides, honeypot systems are usually deployed behind a NAT 
capable device and only the services offered by honeypot system can be reached from outside networks. 
Some techniques for fingerprinting a TCP/IP stacks have been proposed, but they were evaded easily without 
doing a lot of changes in honeypot code. 
Spitzner said that in order to avoid fingerprinting, realism must be developed, blend it with the 
environment and modify honeypot behavior [1]. However, in case of low interaction honeypots, increasing 
the realism means to program better network service emulators with more features, and as a consequence, to 
increase the interaction offered by them. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the background is divided into 
honeypots and fingerprinting. In Section 3 we detail different schemes used for deploying low interaction 
honeypots and the different approaches of fingerprinting a remote network system. In Section 4 we detail our 
proposed solution. Section 5 shows obtained results after testing different Low Interaction Honeypots. 
Considering our results, Section 6 describes a discussion. In Section 7, Conclusions and Future Work are 






Honeypots can be classified by their function in: research or produce honeypots and also in low and 
high interaction honeypots, by commands, libraries and applications they offer. A Honeynet is a special 
network composes by many systems and a honeypot gateway. 
Production honeypots are deployed in organizations with the purpose of giving a set of systems to 
the black hats, where they can waste their time and computational resources (processor time, memory, 
network time and bandwidth, among others.), by maintaining the production systems in safe. Usually, for 
production honeypots, information is fabricated and put it inside the system, in order to confuse the black 
hats. Examples of such data fabrication are: the creation of fake user’s accounts, documents and directories, 
access to the system, connections to other systems and system logs. We should pay attention to the time of 
data fabrication and create consistent data; otherwise, a black hat could identify fabricated data, for example, 
a directory inside the user home with wrong permissions and created information without a previous access 
of the user, among others. The main functions of this kind of honeypots are to defend the organization by 
causing deception to black hats. The production honeypots usually are installed over a hardware and software 
similar to the production servers in organizations. They can be installed over virtual environments too. 
Research honeypots are mainly found at the universities and their purpose is to learn more about 
black hats techniques by offering many systems in a wide variety of configurations. Due to many universities 
cannot afford new and dedicated computers, honeypots are usually installed on virtual environments or in old 
hardware computers. Commonly, research honeypots are part of a big deployed Honeynet in different 
campus and universities. 
High interaction honeypots are out of the scope of this paper because they are installed over a real 
operating system and the services they offer are not emulators. However, it is important to say that high 
interaction honeypots are deployed over virtual environments and the gathering of information is done over 
the virtual layer, so, the operating system does not need any modification [2]. On the other hand, low 
interaction honeypots offer a wide variety of systems and services emulators to black hats, malicious users or 
malicious software, known as malware. The main advantages of deploying low interaction honeypots are the 
wide area they can cover, the low risk they represent and the vast variety of services they can emulate. In 
addition to that, low interaction honeypots could be fingerprinted because they use emulators and have less 
functionality than real systems with real network services and the interaction they offer is limited. 
In [3], authors show some features that only low interaction honeypots have. Most of them can be 
emulated, in example, by sending pseudorandom traffic to honeypots in order to increase reality or by 
emulating a few systems to avoid over-heading software. The other features are optional, extensive logging 
can be covered with the use of a Gateway Honeynet and bandwidth restriction is desirable but also optional 
and is specified by each organization. Only one feature is inherent of low interaction honeypot and it cannot 
be changed, they do not implement a full-featured network services set. 
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2.2. Fingerprinting 
As biometric fingerprint, where a specific pattern is extracted and compared against a database, the 
identification of systems is possible due to the different implementations of communication protocols, 
network services or specific environments. These different features are collected and then a fingerprint is 
generated, which include enough features to unequivocally identify a specific system of a set of different 
systems. Some features that are used to identify systems are specific responses to malformed queries, 
mistakes in the implementations like misspelled words in error messages, typical behavior like special 
characters for paths or a specific set of addresses, initial counters or identification numbers, error messages in 
different anomalous queries, time response or an amount of resources, such as: amount of connections and 
child processes. In order to the fingerprinting tool loses accuracy, such features can be changed, but some of 
them are very difficult to change and need a high level programming.  
As a general rule, a honeypot should not be detected. But if it is identified, it loses all its value. For 
production honeypots, the black hats could change their target system and attack a production system. As a 
consequence, they would be able to obtain valuable information. Moreover, in the case of research 
honeypots, the possibility to learn about black hat community becomes impossible. To prevent and hinder 
this possibility, the good practices indicate changes to the default settings. However, the architecture of low 
interaction honeypots makes this task more difficult. In other words, it is not customizable. 
There are two ways to avoid fingerprinting: scrubbing and camouflaging. The first one is the 
modification of the output in a communication, where the fingerprinting tool cannot determine the identity of 
the target system. The second one refers to the modification of different expected outputs of other 
implementations of the protocol, which gives as a result an exact wrong match in the fingerprinting tool. 
Nevertheless, if the fingerprint sequence is large, the camouflage could be almost as expensive as the 
redeployment of a different protocol implementation. Definitions of on-line and off-line defenses against the 
fingerprinting and their features can be found in [4]. 
In addition, in [4] authors propose minimum set of tests for Nmap, in order to fingerprint an OS 
without the use of malformed packets, as a consequence a low probability of being a Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS) is obtained. Due the application fingerprinting uses complete handshake 
connections, the probability of sensing it or blocking it is low. 
 
 
3. RELATED WORK 
 
3.1. Schemes for Deploying Low Interaction Honeypots 
In this section, four schemes for deploying low interaction honeypots sensors are described, the first 
one is the simplest scheme to configure and maintain them and the fourth one is the most complex scheme. 
They are described as follows and showed in Figure 1. 
The first scheme is the installation and configuration of a low interaction honeypot. Then it is 
necessary to assign a public IP and connect it to the Internet. This scheme is commonly used to sense and 
analyzepropagation methods of worms and Internet traffic statistics. 
The second scheme includes also the installation and configuration of a packet filtering firewall. Its 
main function is to redirect specific network traffic to the honeypot. In order to redirect such traffic, the 
packet filtering firewall analyses network traffic and checks it against a rule set. If features match with a rule, 
the firewall redirects such packets to the honeypot. Typical rules are: filtering source and destination IP, 
destination port and flags in the TCP packet header. 
The third scheme is similar to the second one with the difference that it includes a network traffic 
normalizer in the packet filtering firewall, commonly called scrubber. Examples of scrubbers are: the BSD's 
IP-filter with the enabled option scrub and the use of IP personality or a similar module for IP-Tables in 
GNU/Linux. Moreover, in order to restrict ingoing and outgoing network traffic, this scheme can also include 
a honeypot Gateway such as a Honey-wall. 
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Figure 1. The Four Schemes for Deploying Low Interaction Honeypot. 
 
 
After a known attack has been identified, the fourth scheme is designed to redirect network traffic. This 
scheme includes an IPS that senses and redirects network traffic to the honey-net. Such redirection is usually 
enabled for a previously specified time. This scheme can use a honey-net Gateway too and should be the 
preferred scheme for production of honeypots. 
 
3.2. Fingerprinting a Remote Network System 
There are two methods to remotely identify a system in a network, the passive and the active. The 
first one uses a network sniffer and then analyses all network traffic passing by the NIC. After that and 
considering a database, it tries to identify the system. This kind of remote identification will not be 
considered in this paper, because we do not consider passive identification due to there is no exist an 
interaction between honeypot and black hat, before such black hat take control of a honeypot. The second 
one sends specific request over the network and then analyses the responses. After that, it determinates the 
identity of remote system by comparing it against a fingerprint database. Different approaches to 
fingerprinting a remote system are explained in the following subsections. 
 
3.2.1. Interactive Fingerprinting  
This approach uses a well-known request and as a consequence it is very easy to detect and evade. 
Actually low interaction honeypots have the same fingerprint and it gives the exact response to the 
fingerprinting tool. These tools have a module to identify network services and are based on offered banners 
by remote services. 
This approach is useless for all schemes even Honeyd due to itself is able to fool the fingerprinting 
tool by representing the personality of a honeypot according to the Nmap or Xprobe2 fingerprinting files and 
by responding the expected values for such tools [2]. In [3], an analysis of time technique to detect low 
interaction honeypots with good results in local area was proposed, which required sending a lot of packets 
and was very dependent of network topology. 
 
3.2.2. Statistical Fingerprinting 
This approach sends many requests and then applies a statistical analysis over received replies in 
order to identify the remote system. This approach is very sensitive to changes in network topology and only 
can be successful in the first scheme in the TCP/IP stack. In the second scheme could be when it is used in 
network services fingerprinting. In [3], 49 quantitative and qualitative features to fingerprinting TCP/IP stack 
were proposed. In such proposal the analysis of time is done over the response of ICMP messages. They also 
demonstrated honeypot systems respond slower than real systems. 
 
3.2.3. The Fuzzy Approach 
The use of fuzzy logic, as in other scenarios [5] [6] gives different advantages.In a honeypots 
detection processgives the advantage to identify the kind of honeypot is being used. In other words, from a 
set of possibilities, it is assigned a membership grade, identifying in this way, the major of them. All of this is 
made in order to get such advantage. Based on the TCP/IP stack, the fingerprinting procedure can be evaded 
in all schemes, but it is a useful identification mechanism. The main problem of this approach is the 
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definition of the membership functions for the fuzzy system, which depends on the amount of features to be 
evaluated. The Xprobe2 tool employs this approachwith the use of ICMP tests. In [7], a detailed description 




Figure 2. Proposed procedure for generation of low-interaction honeypot fingerprint. 
 
 
3.2.4. The Network Service Approach 
This approach focuses on fingerprinting network services. It covers a small amount of computers 
because it can only be used against systems that are offering the service. Even this approach seems to be the 
most limited, it is the best option to fingerprint low interaction honeypots. The reason to use this approach 
over the other ones is that network services in a honeypot are emulators and they are limited to only respond 
a small amount of requests. This approach usually employs fuzzy logic in a hierarchy way. An HTTP 
fingerprinting is preceded by a TCP/IP fingerprinting prove even though Nmap has become less effective 
now [4]. In [3] authors show results with different features in real services, moreover Honeyd services were 
given. However, it did not explain how the services are test. 
There exist modules to fingerprinting HTTP Server available to Nmap and Xprobe2. This last one 
has also a module to test HTTP in spite of it is only used to help the identification of the Operating System. 
In addition to that, there exist many implementations of Honeyd that use different scripts to impersonate as 
HTTP services. There are other Honeyd scripts services, such as: FTP and Telnet. However, nowadays they 
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4. SOLUTION PROPOSED 
 
4.1. The Procedure 
The procedure we use is divided into six stages as can be seen in Figure 2. The first step determines 
the simulation scenario for generating fingerprints. The second one defines instances that we used in the 
identification process. The third stage carries out a process between the system evaluation and Honeypot. 
Once this process is completed, we analyzed obtained results. After that, if such results allow identifying the 
Honeypot with a percentage of acceptable effectiveness; we proceed to generate the Honeypot fingerprint. 
Otherwise, we adjust the instances or/and the evaluation process. This stage is repeated until an acceptable 





Figure 3. Our testing scenario considers four main elements 
 
 
Table 1. Specifications of systems used 
System Processor RAM Hard Disk Software 
Honeypot 2 x 2.24GHz 2 GB 80 GB Honeyd 
Protection Pentium 4 2.4GHz 1 GB 1x80GB OpenBSD 3.8 
Honeynet Gateway Pentium 4 2.4GHz 1 GB 1x40GB HoneyWall roo-1.4 
Referee Intel Core 2 Duo 1.5GHz 4 GB 100GB BackTrack 4.2 
 
 
4.2 Definition of Our Simulation Scenario 
The Low Interaction Honeypot systems have a limited range of messages that can respond, as well 
as the amount of services that emulate. 
One of the Low Interaction Honeypots has the greatest number of HTTP services emulators and 
message is ¨Honeyd¨. Considering that and with the intention to use a simulation scenario as close as the 
production, we proposed to use a topology consisting of: one Packet Firewall also called Honeywall and one 
HoneyPot. The Honeywall is a system that captures all requests made in the evaluation process and the Low 
Interaction Honepot. 
Figure 3 shows mentioned scenario and Table 1 summarizes their characteristics. In such Table it is 
important to mention that we did use a Honeyd for installing Low Interaction Honeypot, moreover we did 
install Web.sh as network emulators, Apache script 1.3.23, IIS Microsoft emulator IIS/5.0 and y Honeyweb 
0.4 that emulates versions of HTTP implementation. 
Honeypot System 
In the Honeypot we installed the GNU/Linux Debian Operating System, version 6.0 and kernel 
version 2.6.32 with minimal installation of the system. We updated obsolete programs, and then we 
downloaded programs for this profile (Honeyd 1.5c version, Honeyweb-0.4, additional scripts for SUSE and 
Apache Web Server version 2.2.18). Finally we created virtual systems that have an associated IP address 
and emulators script of HTTP. 
Protection System 
In the protector we installed the OpenBSD Operating System version 4.8, we configured the IPfilter 
and the scrub function was enabled. 
Honeynet Gateway System 
In this system we installed and set up the default HoneyWall root-20090425114542-1.4.hw. We 
defined two network cards in bridge mode and a third one for administration. We also defined network 
services offered by the administration interface. Walleye GUI was enabled. 
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Table 2. Comparison of status codes between Honeyd emulators and Apache server. 
Status Code Httpd Total Codes Web. Sh Apache.Sh Lis.Sh Honey Web 0.4 
Successful (2xx) 8 1 1 1 1 
Redirection (3xx) 7 0 0 1 0 
Client Error (4xx) 22 1 1 1 5 




In our tester, Backtrack System Version 4.2 was installed and the signatures of the HTTPrint 
Version 0.301 were updated.For all computer equipment we made a minimum installation of the system and 
also for configuration of Sebek source code (data capture tool, which captures the activities of attackers on a 
Honeypot). 
 
4.3 Definition of Instances 
During the definition of instances stage we made an evaluation through service exercising 
techniques to identify emulators of network service of Low Interaction Honeypot System.This kind of 
evaluation involves a remote tester system that unknowns the architecture and the remote system to be 
evaluated, which is known as black box evaluation. Therefore the selection of instances contemplates the 
state codes to the answers given by HoneyPot. 
The status codes of HTTP protocol are established in [8] and [9] and they are divided into the 
following families: 
 Informative 1xx indicates a provisional response and is only sent to clients in terms of experimentation. 
 Success 2xx indicates that the client request was received, understood and accepted. 
 Redirection 3xx refers to further action and is required by the user agent to complete the request. 
 4xx is related to client error that happens when request issued by the client has error. 
 Server Error 5xx occurs where the server is unable to perform the request. 
As part of definition of instances we compared the states codes found in the source code of different 
emulators of HTTP to Honeyd against those one found in the implementation of Apache Web Server 2.2.18, 





Figure 4. The identification process that is made by the HTTPrint is fooled by Honeyd 
 
 
4.4 Evaluation of Low Interaction Honeypots 
As we mentioned before, our simulation scenario depicted in Figure 3, has a remote computer that is 
responsible for the evaluation and the interaction with architecture of Low-Interaction Honeypot. In addition 
to that we propose requests injection of type HTTP, which are made by tester system. Such requests are made 
with the aim that Honeypot answers them according to the characteristics of each emulator has. 
In the tester system we activate the Whireshark tool to capture the network traffic that is exchanged 
between the tester system and the Honeyd architecture. In addition to that we did run HTTPrint tool with the 
intention of observing what remote system was identified during evaluation.As is possible to see in Figure 4, 
fingerprinting identification process that is made by the HTTPrint, is fooled by Honeyd because identifying 
emulators like they were HTTP servers. After that, we did proceed to analyze information of stored flows and 
requests made by the tester system. 
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5. RESULTS 
The first parameter we consider in our analysis is the number of status codes implemented in 
Honeyd HTTP scripts. As we did mention before they are defined [8-10] and as a result of pcap files 
analysis, we observe that HTTPrint tool makes 23 requests to define the kind of remote system to be 
identified. 
The analysis of the number of status codes implemented in Honeyd HTTP scripts and in a real 
HTTP server shows us a significant difference between them. Table 2 summarizes the number of status codes 
offered by Apache httpd 2.2.18 (HTTPD), by the Honeyd scripts web.sh (WEB), by apache.sh (APACHE), 
by iis.sh (IIS) from Honeyd scripts for SUSE and Windows and finally HoneyWeb 0.4 (HWEB). As is shown 
in Figure 5, after execution of HTTPrint against Honeyd scripts, the new signatures were obtained. Such 
signatures were written in the signatures.txt file with the name of correspondent emulator. Then we repeat 










Figure 6. New obtained signatures of Honeyd HTTP scripts. 
 
 
Moreover, even if HoneyWeb is able to emulate 4 versions of IIS, 8 versions of Apache and 3 
versions of Netscape Enterprise, a single signature allows detecting all versions. After that, the new 
signatures were added to previous ones and re-run HTTPrint with all Honeyd scripts successfully detected. It 
is presented in Figure 6. In addition, due to the fingerprinting service is made over a valid connection and the 
huge amount of possible queries, this method is more difficult to be identified by an IDS. As a consequence, 
it is only important to make a modification in the query, such as: do the request GET / HTTP/1.1, increase 
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the field of the version or subversion or change a single character in the GET /antidisestablishmentarianism 




From obtained results we can state the following important points: 
 The HTTP emulators for Honeyd answer very differently to HTTPrint requests. 
 Web.sh emulators, apache.sh and honeyweb.sh do not send any answer to requests Htprint. 
 The apache.sh emulators, iis.sh and honeyweb send status codes of success when they should send client 
error codes. 
 The web.sh and web.sh emulators send status codes of error when they should send status codes of server 
error. 
 The difference between HTTP emulators for Honeyd and a real HTTP server is very strong due to these 
latter implements, in a more complex way, status codes in the protocol standard and not just a portion. 
 Being the same HTTP emulators for Honeyd, the same answer for HTTPrint requests is presented, 
regardless of the distribution of the Operating System or their respective architecture. 
 
 
Table 3. Results of the analysis of stored flow. 
HTTPRINT QUERY HTTPD WEB APACHE IIS HWEB 
garbage 501 - - 400 - 
GET / HTTP/1.0 200 404 200 200 200 
GET / HTTP/1.0 (*) 200 404 200 200 200 
OPTIONS * HTTP/1.0 200 404 501 400 200 
OPTIONS / HTTP/1.0 200 404 501 400 200 
GET /antidisestablishmentarianism HTTP/1.0 404 404 400 302 200 
PUT / HTTP/1.0 405 404 501 400 - 
JUNKMETHOD / HTTP/1.0 501 404 501 400 - 
GET JUNK /1.0 200 404 501 400 - 
get / http/1.0 501 404 501 400 - 
POST / HTTP/1.0 200 404 501 400 200 
GET /cgi-bin/ HTTP/1.0 403 404 400 302 200 
GET/scripts/ HTTP/1.0 404 404 400 302 200 
GET / HTTP/0.8 200 404 501 400 200 
GET / HTTP/0.9 200 404 501 400 - 
GET / HTTP/1.1 Connection: close 200 404 200 200 200 
GET / HTTP/1.2 Connection: close 200 404 501 400 200 
GET / HTTP/1.1 (**) 400 404 200 200 200 
GET / HTTP/1.2 (**) 400 404 501 400 200 
GET / HTTP/3.0 200 404 501 400 200 
GET /. asmx HTTP/1.0 404 404 400 302 - 
GET /../../ HTTP/1.0 400 404 400 302 200 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The fingerprinting of TCP/IP stack is useless against common low interaction honeypots due to the 
amount of characteristics and limited responses of specific request. Nevertheless, low interaction honeypots 
are susceptible to fingerprint of network services. It is because of the differences between a real service and 
emulator scripts. 
Fingerprinting of network services is successful because of the amount of available options in the 
construction of queries, making the fingerprinting tools hard to be detected. Moreover, the attack could be 
made in a long period of time, reducing in this way, a possible identification of the tool. In addition it is very 
concerning that there are tools ready to detect low interaction honeypots such as: HTTPrintthat is a way to 
generate new fingerprints and add them to signatures files. In addition to that, the use of fuzzy logic in 
fingerprinting tools increases success rate of identification. Moreover, nowadays, as we have found, low 
interaction honeypots need to be improved in order to ensure their correct functionality. Otherwise, they 
should not be deployed as research honeypots. Unfortunately, recent activity in some low interaction 
honeypots sensors projects is null. 
As future work, a research on detecting high interaction honeypots will be done, in addition to the 
creation of a fingerprinting tool of low interaction honeypots in order to be used in different network 
services. Finally, it is important to mention that another challenge would be to design a fingerprinting tool 
that is able to identity what kind of honeypot scheme is being used. 
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